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Statelessness,	  the	  existence	  of	  millions	  of	  people	  who	  do	  not	  belong	  in	  a	  
meaningful	  sense	  to	  any	  political	  community,	  is	  an	  increasingly	  important	  political	  
problem.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  there	  are	  72	  million	  people	  who	  have	  been	  forcibly	  
displaced	  from	  their	  homes	  and	  have	  no	  effective	  citizenship,1	  the	  majority	  of	  whom	  
remain	  in	  this	  situation	  for	  more	  than	  15	  years	  or	  permanently.2	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  
each	  state	  –	  rightly	  or	  wrongly	  –	  believes	  that	  it	  is	  justified	  in	  including	  only	  those	  
individuals	  that	  they	  choose	  to	  admit.	  In	  other	  words,	  most	  states	  do	  not	  
acknowledge	  an	  obligation	  to	  admit	  people	  who	  have	  nowhere	  else	  to	  live;	  and	  
when	  they	  do	  accept	  refugees,	  it	  is	  considered	  an	  ex	  gratia	  policy,	  arising	  out	  of	  
generosity	  rather	  than	  the	  fulfillment	  of	  a	  moral	  or	  legal	  norm.3	  The	  result	  is	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  This	  surprising	  large	  number	  is	  from	  the	  most	  recent	  report	  of	  the	  International	  
Federation	  of	  Red	  Cross	  and	  Red	  Crescent	  Societies,	  World	  Disasters	  Report	  2012:	  
Focus	  on	  Forced	  Migration	  and	  Displacement.	  The	  figure	  of	  72	  million	  displaced	  
people	  encompasses	  both	  people	  who	  are	  displaced	  within	  their	  home	  countries	  
and	  who	  have	  crossed	  borders	  due	  to	  conflict,	  repression,	  persecution,	  disasters,	  
environmental	  degradation,	  development	  projects,	  poverty	  and	  poor	  governance.	  
Importantly,	  it	  does	  not	  include	  “economic	  migrants,”	  people	  who	  choose	  to	  leave	  
their	  countries	  to	  pursue	  economic	  opportunities,	  but	  only	  people	  who	  “are	  forced	  
to	  leave	  their	  homes	  due	  to	  events	  beyond	  their	  immediate	  control”	  (International	  
Federation	  of	  Red	  Cross	  and	  Red	  Crescent	  Societies	  2012,	  14).	  
2	  This	  is	  another	  of	  the	  important	  findings	  in	  the	  report	  cited	  above:	  “most	  migrants	  
are	  either	  in	  protracted	  displacement	  situations	  or	  permanently	  dispossessed”	  
(International	  Federation	  of	  Red	  Cross	  and	  Red	  Crescent	  Societies	  2012,	  9).	  	  
3	  The	  1980	  Refugee	  Act	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  the	  act	  that	  set	  the	  legal	  framework	  for	  
the	  US	  action	  on	  refugees,	  states	  the	  following:	  “the	  underlying	  principle	  is	  that	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situation	  in	  which	  a	  population	  larger	  than	  that	  of	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  –	  one	  in	  
every	  100	  of	  the	  world’s	  citizens	  –	  lives	  more	  or	  less	  permanently	  outside	  the	  
nation-­‐state	  system	  and	  no	  state	  acknowledges	  political	  or	  moral	  responsibility	  for	  
this	  group.	  	  
	   Given	  the	  political	  importance	  of	  this	  phenomenon,	  I	  argue	  in	  this	  paper	  that	  
philosophers	  ought	  to	  be	  concerned	  with	  clarifying	  our	  moral	  obligations	  to	  people	  
living	  in	  a	  condition	  of	  statelessness.	  By	  “our”	  moral	  obligations,	  I	  mean	  the	  
obligations	  of	  states	  who	  at	  least	  potentially	  have	  the	  resources	  to	  address	  the	  
situation,	  and	  who	  play	  a	  meaningful	  role	  in	  the	  current	  global	  community	  (via	  the	  
United	  Nations	  and	  its	  affiliated	  institutions,	  as	  well	  as	  other	  international	  
organizations	  like	  the	  World	  Bank,	  the	  International	  Monetary	  Fund,	  and	  the	  World	  
Trade	  Organization),	  as	  well	  as	  the	  obligations	  of	  individuals	  as	  members	  of	  a	  global	  
community	  concerned	  with	  human	  rights.	  To	  do	  this,	  I	  argue	  that	  we	  need	  to	  both	  
reframe	  our	  understanding	  of	  the	  problem	  of	  statelessness	  in	  the	  contemporary	  
world	  and	  our	  understanding	  of	  the	  obligations	  that	  this	  situation	  gives	  rise	  to.	  	  
	   This	  paper	  has	  two	  parts.	  In	  the	  first	  part,	  I	  critically	  assess	  philosophical	  
analyses	  of	  the	  problem	  of	  refugees	  and	  stateless	  people.	  Philosophical	  discourse	  
has	  focused	  on	  whether	  or	  not	  we	  in	  the	  West	  have	  moral	  obligations	  to	  admit	  
refugees,	  or	  whether	  we	  can	  morally	  justify	  closing	  our	  borders.	  In	  other	  words,	  
philosophers	  have	  largely	  focused	  on	  an	  ethics	  of	  admission.	  I	  show	  that	  though	  this	  
is	  an	  important	  question,	  it	  is	  too	  narrow.	  By	  focusing	  on	  admission,	  philosophers	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
refugee	  admissions	  is	  an	  exceptional	  ex	  gratia	  act	  provided	  by	  the	  United	  States	  in	  
furthering	  foreign	  and	  humanitarian	  policies”	  (quoted	  in	  Singer	  and	  Singer	  1988,	  
116).	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have	  been	  effectively	  concerned	  with	  only	  de	  jure	  refugees,	  people	  who	  are	  eligible	  
for	  admission	  to	  a	  new	  country,	  and	  have	  failed	  to	  consider	  the	  obligations	  we	  may	  
have	  to	  people	  who	  remain	  outside	  of	  all	  political	  communities	  for	  prolonged	  
periods	  of	  time.	  The	  focus	  on	  the	  ethics	  of	  admission	  renders	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  
stateless	  people	  normatively	  invisible	  and	  does	  not	  fully	  address	  the	  situation	  of	  
statelessness	  in	  the	  global	  context	  described	  above.	   	  
In	  the	  second	  part	  of	  the	  paper,	  I	  argue	  that	  in	  order	  to	  understand	  our	  moral	  
obligations	  to	  stateless	  people,	  both	  de	  jure	  refugees	  and	  de	  facto	  stateless	  people,	  
we	  ought	  to	  reconceptualize	  the	  harm	  of	  statelessness	  as	  entailing	  both	  a	  
legal/political	  harm	  (the	  loss	  of	  citizenship)	  as	  well	  as	  an	  ontological	  harm,	  a	  
deprivation	  of	  certain	  fundamental	  human	  qualities.	  To	  do	  this,	  I	  draw	  on	  the	  work	  
of	  Hannah	  Arendt	  and	  show	  that	  the	  ontological	  deprivation	  has	  three	  distinct	  
though	  interconnected	  elements:	  a	  reduction	  to	  the	  merely	  human	  or	  bare	  life,	  a	  
separation	  from	  the	  common	  realm	  of	  humanity	  and	  abandonment,	  and	  the	  
diminishment	  of	  agency	  or	  ability	  to	  act	  in	  the	  Arendtian	  sense.	  Yet	  it	  is	  important	  to	  
note	  that	  for	  Arendt,	  though	  the	  ontological	  deprivation	  of	  statelessness	  is	  a	  
fundamental	  one,	  it	  is	  not	  absolute.	  By	  this	  I	  mean	  that	  though	  stateless	  people	  have	  
a	  diminished	  capacity	  to	  act	  in	  Arendt’s	  distinct	  sense,	  they	  always	  retain	  this	  ability	  
at	  a	  fundamental	  level.	  This	  is	  because	  for	  Arendt	  action	  is	  rooted	  in	  the	  human	  
condition	  of	  natality,	  the	  fact	  that	  we	  are	  beings	  who	  are	  born	  and	  are	  by	  our	  very	  
nature	  beginners.	  Thus	  stateless	  people	  always	  have	  the	  possibility	  for	  action,	  and	  
Arendt	  herself	  is	  fond	  of	  discussing	  examples	  of	  action	  that	  emerge	  from	  people	  who	  
have	  been	  marginalized	  in	  various	  ways.	  However,	  what	  is	  important	  about	  the	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ontological	  deprivation	  is	  that	  stateless	  people,	  in	  virtue	  of	  this	  status,	  are	  deprived	  
of	  two	  other	  conditions	  that	  are	  essential	  for	  action	  –	  a	  public	  space	  to	  make	  
opportunities	  for	  action	  more	  than	  rare	  exceptions,	  and	  an	  ability	  to	  be	  judged	  as	  
speaking	  and	  acting	  agents.	  Consequently,	  I	  argue	  that	  Arendt	  is	  able	  to	  give	  us	  a	  
framework	  for	  understanding	  why	  statelessness	  is	  a	  fundamental	  harm,	  yet	  without	  
denying	  that	  stateless	  people	  retain	  their	  humanity	  and	  capacity	  for	  agency	  in	  a	  
basic	  way.	  As	  such	  her	  understanding	  of	  the	  harm	  of	  statelessness	  –	  as	  fundamental	  
but	  never	  absolute	  –	  provides	  the	  best	  framework	  for	  addressing	  this	  contemporary	  
political	  problem.	  
	  On	  my	  reading	  of	  Arendt,	  the	  problem	  with	  statelessness	  is	  that	  it	  has	  these	  
two	  distinct,	  though	  interrelated,	  harms	  –	  a	  legal/political	  harm	  and	  an	  ontological	  
one.	  The	  main	  goal	  of	  this	  paper	  is	  to	  establish	  that	  statelessness	  ought	  to	  be	  
understood	  as	  entailing	  both	  sets	  of	  harms.	  If	  we	  pull	  these	  two	  sets	  of	  harms	  apart,	  
we	  are	  better	  able	  to	  see	  that	  we	  can	  address	  some	  of	  the	  features	  of	  the	  ontological	  
deprivation	  even	  though	  we	  may	  not	  be	  able	  to	  rectify	  the	  political	  harm	  through	  
resettlement.	  I	  conclude	  by	  suggesting	  that	  our	  obligations	  to	  stateless	  people	  will	  
consist	  in	  changing	  our	  policies	  and	  practices	  towards	  refugees	  in	  order	  to	  
minimize,	  if	  not	  eliminate,	  the	  ontological	  deprivation.	  Ultimately,	  the	  challenge	  will	  
be	  to	  create	  spaces	  and	  conditions	  where	  refugees	  and	  stateless	  people	  can	  be	  seen	  
and	  heard,	  where	  their	  action	  and	  speech	  can	  gain	  meaning,	  so	  that	  ultimately	  we	  
can	  see	  them	  as	  equal	  members	  of	  our	  common	  humanity,	  whether	  or	  not	  we	  also	  
acknowledge	  them	  as	  citizens.	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Part	  I:	  Refugees	  and	  The	  Ethics	  of	  Admission	  
Michael	  Walzer	  was	  one	  of	  the	  first	  philosophers	  to	  discuss	  our	  moral	  
obligations	  to	  refugees	  and	  he	  initiated	  the	  debate	  by	  stressing	  that	  refugees	  differ	  
from	  immigrants	  in	  general	  because	  of	  the	  moral	  dimension	  of	  their	  claims.	  
Refugees,	  he	  writes,	  “make	  the	  most	  forceful	  claim	  for	  admission.	  ‘If	  you	  don’t	  take	  
me	  in,’	  they	  say,	  ‘I	  shall	  be	  killed,	  persecuted,	  brutally	  oppressed	  by	  the	  rulers	  of	  my	  
own	  country’”	  (Walzer	  2008,	  163).	  Walzer	  defined	  refugees	  as	  people	  whose	  moral	  
claims,	  “cannot	  be	  met	  by	  yielding	  territory	  or	  exporting	  wealth,	  but	  only	  by	  taking	  
people	  in”	  (Walzer	  2008,	  163).	  Because	  he	  understands	  refugees	  as	  suffering	  a	  
political	  loss,	  the	  loss	  of	  political	  belonging,	  he	  argues	  that	  our	  moral	  obligations	  to	  
them	  can	  only	  be	  met	  by	  admitting	  them	  to	  our	  country.	  This	  definition	  laid	  the	  
foundation	  for	  the	  contemporary	  debate	  around	  moral	  obligations	  to	  refugees	  in	  
philosophy.	  	  
	   Since	  Walzer	  put	  forth	  this	  view,	  a	  number	  of	  other	  philosophers	  have	  
entered	  the	  debate.	  For	  example,	  Barbieri	  (1998),	  Carens	  (1992),	  Cole	  (2000),	  
Gibney	  (2004),	  Nyers	  (2006),	  Singer	  and	  Singer	  (1988),	  and	  Wellman	  (2008),	  
among	  others,	  have	  all	  written	  about	  our	  moral	  obligations	  to	  refugees.	  Although	  
there	  is	  no	  consensus	  on	  the	  question	  of	  what	  these	  obligations	  are	  exactly,	  there	  is	  
one	  important	  point	  that	  is	  agreed	  upon	  by	  all	  these	  authors:	  the	  question	  of	  
whether	  we	  are	  obliged	  to	  admit	  refugees	  to	  our	  country	  is	  the	  primary	  moral	  
question.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  ethics	  of	  admission	  has	  come	  to	  dominate	  the	  
philosophical	  landscape	  and	  be	  the	  almost	  exclusive	  focus	  of	  normative	  philosophy.	  
This	  is	  due	  in	  no	  small	  part	  to	  Walzer’s	  initial	  definition	  of	  refugees	  as	  people	  whose	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legitimate	  moral	  claims	  can	  only	  be	  met	  by	  admission	  to	  a	  state.	  Since	  Walzer,	  all	  
philosophers	  stress	  the	  legal/political	  dimension	  of	  the	  harm	  of	  statelessness	  and	  
the	  importance	  of	  ethical	  consideration	  of	  admission	  standards.	  	  
	   The	  philosophical	  debate	  over	  the	  ethics	  of	  admission	  entails	  a	  debate	  over	  
how	  to	  give	  a	  foundation	  for	  our	  moral	  obligation	  to	  admit	  refugees,	  due	  to	  the	  
urgency	  and	  uniqueness	  of	  their	  needs,	  while	  simultaneously	  maintaining	  an	  ethical	  
basis	  for	  closure,	  which	  would	  preserve	  the	  self-­‐determination	  of	  a	  given	  
community.	  One	  of	  the	  reasons	  that	  this	  question	  became	  so	  philosophically	  
important	  is	  because	  it	  goes	  to	  the	  heart	  of	  a	  tension	  in	  liberal	  political	  theory:	  how	  
to	  balance	  treating	  all	  people	  equally	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  protecting	  a	  
democracy’s	  ability	  to	  exclude	  some	  people	  from	  citizenship.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  
ethics	  of	  admission	  posed	  a	  challenge	  for	  liberalism:	  any	  liberal	  position	  that	  holds	  
that	  we	  can	  deny	  refugees	  admission	  to	  our	  country	  must	  do	  so	  in	  a	  way	  that	  does	  
not	  deny	  the	  fundamental	  equality	  of	  refugees	  and	  stateless	  people.	  So	  difficult	  is	  
this	  balance	  to	  reach	  that	  Philip	  Cole	  has	  argued	  that	  it	  reveals	  “an	  irresolvable	  
contradiction	  between	  liberal	  theory’s	  apparent	  universalism	  and	  its	  concealed	  
particularism”	  (Cole	  2000,	  2).	  
Michael	  Walzer	  tried	  to	  balance	  moral	  equality	  with	  political	  closure	  by	  
stressing	  the	  importance	  of	  distinctive	  “communities	  of	  character”	  for	  human	  
existence.	  According	  to	  his	  argument,	  because	  unique	  political	  communities	  give	  
meaning	  to	  our	  lives,	  and	  in	  order	  to	  be	  unique,	  communities	  require	  closure,	  we	  
can	  conclude	  that	  closure	  at	  some	  level	  is	  morally	  justifiable.	  In	  other	  words,	  we	  
have	  the	  right	  to	  exclude	  people	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  maintaining	  these	  important	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“communities	  of	  character.”	  This	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  we	  have	  no	  obligations	  to	  
refugees	  or	  other	  outsiders.	  He	  stresses	  that	  because	  of	  the	  urgency	  of	  the	  moral	  
claims	  of	  refugees,	  we	  are	  obliged	  to	  admit	  at	  least	  some	  refugees,	  but	  it	  is	  up	  to	  
particular	  communities	  to	  decide	  which	  refugees	  we	  take	  in	  and	  how	  many.	  Thus	  
Walzer	  is	  able	  to	  acknowledge	  a	  moral	  basis	  for	  our	  obligations	  to	  refugees	  but	  
simultaneously	  provides	  an	  ethical	  basis	  for	  closure	  that	  preserves	  equality.	  	  
More	  recently,	  Seyla	  Benhabib	  (2004	  and	  2011)	  has	  also	  taken	  up	  this	  task	  
through	  a	  consideration	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  “just	  membership	  practices.”	  By	  this	  she	  
means,	  “principles	  and	  practices	  for	  incorporating	  aliens	  and	  strangers,	  immigrants	  
and	  newcomers,	  refugees	  and	  asylum	  seekers	  into	  existing	  polities”	  (Benhabib	  
2004,	  1;	  Benhabib	  2011,	  138-­‐9).	  In	  other	  words,	  for	  Benhabib,	  like	  Walzer,	  the	  
primary	  ethical	  question	  concerning	  refugees	  is	  the	  moral	  basis	  for	  admission	  or	  
exclusion.	  Benhabib	  (2004)	  argues	  that	  we	  have	  a	  robust	  obligation	  to	  allow	  
refugees	  into	  our	  country,	  but	  not	  one	  that	  is	  unrestricted.	  According	  to	  her	  view	  of	  
discourse	  ethics,	  we	  are	  justified	  in	  excluding	  refugees	  only	  if	  we	  can	  show	  them	  
good	  grounds,	  “grounds	  that	  would	  be	  acceptable	  to	  each	  of	  us	  equally,	  why	  you	  can	  
never	  join	  our	  association	  and	  become	  one	  of	  us.	  These	  must	  be	  grounds	  that	  you	  
would	  accept	  if	  you	  were	  in	  my	  situation	  and	  I	  were	  in	  yours”	  (Benhabib	  2004,	  
138).4	  Despite	  differing	  from	  Walzer	  in	  fundamental	  ways,	  Benhabib	  too	  considers	  
the	  ethics	  of	  admissions	  to	  be	  the	  central	  ethical	  question.	  Indeed,	  this	  question	  
remains	  the	  dominant	  one	  whether	  you	  agree	  that	  we	  have	  much	  stronger	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  Good	  reasons	  include	  a	  lack	  of	  qualifications,	  skills	  or	  resources,	  but	  not	  some	  
unalterable	  feature	  of	  yourself	  such	  as	  your	  gender	  or	  ethnicity,	  since	  the	  former	  
would	  not	  deny	  your	  communicative	  freedom.	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obligations	  to	  admit	  refugees	  than	  we	  currently	  do	  (as	  people	  like	  Benhabib,	  
Barbieri,	  Carens	  and	  Singer	  and	  Singer	  do)	  or	  that	  states	  are	  justified	  in	  closing	  their	  
doors	  to	  “all	  potential	  immigrants,	  even	  refugees	  desperately	  seeking	  asylum	  from	  
incompetent	  or	  corrupt	  political	  regimes”	  (Wellman	  2008,	  109).	  Regardless	  of	  the	  
outcome,	  justifying	  including	  or	  excluding	  the	  displaced	  from	  our	  political	  
communities	  has	  been	  the	  primary	  task	  for	  philosophers	  
Though	  the	  ethics	  of	  admission	  remains	  an	  important	  area	  of	  concern,	  I	  
argue	  below	  that	  we	  ought	  to	  expand	  the	  philosophical	  analysis	  beyond	  it.	  There	  are	  
two	  reasons	  for	  this.	  First,	  concentrating	  exclusively	  on	  an	  ethics	  of	  admission	  
focuses	  too	  narrowly	  to	  only	  one	  subset	  of	  stateless	  people	  –	  those	  deemed	  refugees	  
and	  thus	  eligible	  for	  resettlement	  by	  the	  UN	  High	  Commissioner	  for	  Refugees	  
(UNHCR).	  For	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  stateless	  people,	  admission	  to	  a	  Western	  state	  
isn’t	  even	  a	  possibility	  in	  the	  current	  international	  framework.	  Only	  about	  one	  fifth	  
of	  the	  people	  who	  are	  stateless	  are	  eligible	  for	  resettlement	  because	  they	  meet	  the	  
UN’s	  criteria	  of	  a	  refugee;	  of	  those	  eligible,	  only	  a	  fraction	  are	  ever	  resettled	  (less	  
than	  1%).5	  As	  Loescher	  puts	  it,	  “the	  majority	  of	  the	  world’s	  refugees	  are	  not	  offered	  
permanent	  asylum	  or	  opportunity	  to	  integrate	  into	  local	  communities	  by	  most	  Third	  
World	  governments.	  Rather,	  they	  are	  kept	  separate	  and	  dependent	  on	  external	  
assistance	  provided	  by	  the	  international	  community”	  (Loescher	  1993,	  9).	  As	  I	  show	  
below,	  our	  ethical	  norms	  must	  be	  brought	  to	  bear	  on	  all	  people	  who	  are	  “kept	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  Specifically,	  less	  than	  1%	  of	  the	  10.5	  million	  people	  that	  the	  UNHCR	  considers	  
refugees	  are	  ever	  recommended	  by	  the	  agency	  for	  resettlement	  (cited	  on	  the	  
website	  for	  the	  United	  Nations	  High	  Commissioner	  for	  Refugees:	  
http://www.unhcr.org/pages/4a16b1676.html).	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separate”	  from	  the	  rest	  of	  humanity.	  The	  exclusive	  focus	  on	  the	  ethics	  of	  admission	  
renders	  normatively	  invisible	  the	  largest	  group	  of	  stateless	  people.	  
Second,	  the	  ethics	  of	  admission	  does	  not	  take	  into	  consideration	  the	  unique	  
way	  that	  living	  more	  or	  less	  permanently	  outside	  of	  a	  political	  community	  and	  
dependent	  on	  the	  assistance	  of	  the	  international	  community	  harms	  stateless	  people.	  
There	  has	  been	  much	  scholarly	  literature	  examining	  the	  problems	  with	  the	  “refugee	  
regime”	  (the	  international	  humanitarian	  organizations	  and	  domestic	  policies	  by	  
various	  states	  that	  deal	  with	  controlling	  stateless	  populations)	  in	  recent	  years.	  As	  
many	  scholars	  have	  shown,	  the	  refugee	  regime	  is	  at	  best	  morally	  problematic,	  and	  at	  
worst,	  manifests	  a	  unique	  form	  of	  control	  and	  domination.	  This	  has	  lead	  one	  scholar	  
to	  refer	  to	  the	  treatment	  of	  refugees	  and	  stateless	  people	  by	  humanitarian	  
organizations	  as	  “often	  callous,	  sometimes	  cruel,	  and	  –	  nearly	  always	  –	  ineffectual”	  
(Verdirame	  and	  Harrell-­‐Bond	  2005,	  333).	  The	  kind	  of	  harm	  that	  is	  suffered	  by	  
stateless	  people	  living	  outside	  of	  political	  communities,	  under	  the	  control	  of	  
humanitarian	  organizations,	  is	  not	  taken	  seriously	  or	  treated	  as	  morally	  salient	  by	  
normative	  philosophers.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  think	  about	  the	  contemporary	  
phenomena	  of	  prolonged	  encampment,	  humanitarian	  control,	  and	  long-­‐term	  
displacement	  as	  serious	  moral	  issues.	  	  
Because	  normative	  philosophy	  conceives	  of	  statelessness	  as	  primarily	  a	  legal	  
and	  political	  harm	  –	  the	  loss	  of	  citizenship	  –	  it	  is	  unable	  to	  incorporate	  the	  deeper	  
harm	  of	  statelessness	  in	  their	  analysis	  of	  our	  moral	  obligations	  to	  people	  in	  this	  
situation.	  Consequently,	  I	  argue	  that	  we	  ought	  to	  turn	  to	  the	  work	  of	  Hannah	  Arendt	  
to	  develop	  an	  understanding	  of	  statelessness	  that	  is	  more	  fitting	  for	  the	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contemporary	  global	  situation.	  As	  I	  show	  below,	  Arendt	  conceives	  of	  statelessness	  
primarily	  in	  ontological	  terms,	  and	  consequently,	  her	  analysis	  will	  provide	  a	  richer	  
ground	  for	  understanding	  our	  ethical	  obligations	  to	  stateless	  people.	  
	  
Part	  II:	  Arendt	  on	  Statelessness	  –	  the	  Legal	  Dimension	  
	   Arendt	  begins	  her	  analysis	  of	  statelessness	  in	  The	  Origins	  of	  Totalitarianism	  
the	  observation	  that	  starting	  shortly	  after	  World	  War	  I,	  the	  nature	  of	  forced	  
migration	  began	  to	  change.	  While	  there	  had	  always	  been	  “war	  refugees”	  (as	  we	  
would	  call	  them),	  what	  was	  unique	  about	  people	  fleeing	  after	  WWI	  is	  they	  “were	  
welcomed	  nowhere	  and	  could	  be	  assimilated	  nowhere.	  Once	  they	  had	  left	  their	  
homelands	  they	  remained	  homeless,	  once	  they	  had	  left	  their	  state	  they	  became	  
stateless;	  once	  they	  had	  been	  deprived	  of	  their	  human	  rights	  they	  were	  rightless,	  the	  
scum	  of	  the	  earth”	  (Arendt	  1978,	  267).	  For	  Arendt,	  when	  a	  person	  lost	  her	  national	  
citizenship	  and	  became	  stateless,	  she	  became	  “rightless”	  as	  well.	  	  
To	  clarify	  her	  terminology,	  Arendt	  distinguished	  between	  de	  jure	  refugees	  
and	  de	  facto	  stateless	  people.	  De	  jure	  refugees	  are	  people	  who	  meet	  the	  legal	  
definition	  of	  a	  refugee,	  as	  someone	  fleeing	  individual	  political	  persecution.	  Such	  
people	  were	  not	  the	  real	  issue	  for	  Arendt.	  In	  fact,	  she	  claimed	  that	  they	  were	  not	  a	  
“genuine	  political	  problem,”	  since	  besides	  being	  relatively	  few	  in	  number,	  the	  
asylum	  laws	  that	  exited	  at	  the	  time	  did	  act	  as	  a	  genuine	  substitute	  for	  national	  laws	  
(Arendt	  1978,	  295).	  By	  contrast,	  de	  facto	  stateless	  people,	  people	  who	  are	  
effectively	  without	  citizenship	  regardless	  of	  their	  legal	  status,	  comprised	  the	  “core	  of	  
statelessness”	  for	  Arendt	  and	  were	  in	  her	  view	  identical	  with	  “the	  refugee	  question”	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(Arendt	  1976,	  279).	  For	  Arendt,	  de	  facto	  stateless	  people	  included	  all	  people	  who	  
are	  forcibly	  displaced	  and	  without	  any	  form	  of	  effective	  citizenship	  or	  political	  
belonging,	  regardless	  of	  how	  they	  are	  categorized	  legally	  (i.e.,	  as	  refugees,	  asylum	  
seekers,	  forcibly	  displaced,	  sans	  papiers,	  internally	  displaced	  persons,	  war	  refugees,	  
etc.).	  People	  in	  this	  situation	  are,	  in	  her	  words,	  fundamentally	  rightless;	  they	  belong	  
“to	  no	  internationally	  recognizable	  community	  whatever”	  and	  are	  thus	  outside	  “of	  
mankind	  as	  a	  whole”	  (Arendt	  2003,	  150).	  
	   What	  did	  it	  mean	  to	  become	  rightless	  for	  Arendt?	  For	  Arendt,	  the	  
rightlessness	  that	  accompanies	  statelessness	  has	  two	  dimensions:	  a	  legal/political	  
dimension	  and	  an	  ontological	  one.	  Legally,	  it	  meant	  that	  once	  you	  cease	  living	  under	  
the	  jurisdiction	  of	  your	  domestic	  law,	  you	  were	  without	  the	  protection	  of	  any	  other	  
law	  (Arendt	  1976,	  286).	  In	  other	  words,	  once	  you	  are	  removed	  from	  your	  own	  
national	  law	  there	  is	  no	  effective	  way	  to	  treat	  you	  as	  a	  legal	  subject.	  This	  is	  tied	  to	  
her	  critique	  of	  human	  rights,	  which	  were	  understood	  as	  natural	  and	  inalienable	  and	  
thus	  without	  the	  need	  for	  positive	  law	  to	  protect	  them.	  For	  her,	  “the	  loss	  of	  national	  
rights	  was	  identical	  with	  the	  loss	  of	  human	  rights”	  (Arendt	  1978,	  292).	  Thus	  for	  
stateless	  people,	  as	  soon	  as	  they	  lost	  their	  citizenship	  and	  had	  only	  their	  humanity	  
and	  human	  rights	  to	  protect	  them,	  it	  turned	  out	  that	  there	  was	  no	  institution	  willing	  
and	  able	  to	  guarantee	  them.	  Human	  rights	  proved	  impossible	  to	  enforce	  outside	  of	  a	  
political	  community.	  	  
This	  point	  has	  been	  somewhat	  mitigated	  since	  Arendt	  wrote	  this	  in	  1948,	  
with	  the	  advent	  of	  numerous	  human	  rights	  treaties	  and	  declarations,	  especially	  the	  
UN	  Refugee	  Convention	  (1951)	  and	  its	  1967	  Protocol,	  and	  other	  treaties	  concerning	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stateless	  people,	  which	  were	  all	  designed	  precisely	  to	  address	  people	  who	  had	  lost	  
the	  protection	  of	  their	  home	  states.	  Yet	  despite	  this	  legal	  progress,	  the	  consensus	  
among	  many	  scholars	  is	  that	  the	  legal	  protections	  of	  refugees	  and	  stateless	  people	  is	  
at	  best	  precarious	  and	  at	  worst,	  non-­‐existent.6	  Though	  there	  is	  a	  legal	  framework	  in	  
existence	  for	  the	  protection	  of	  refugees,	  many	  states	  are	  still	  reluctant	  to	  
acknowledge	  significant	  obligations	  to	  refugees.	  The	  most	  widely	  accepted	  
obligation,	  non-­‐refoulement,	  is	  often	  respected	  in	  principle	  through	  not	  in	  practice.	  
Further,	  few	  states	  acknowledge	  positive	  obligations	  to	  help	  refugees	  by	  admitting	  
them	  to	  their	  states	  or	  granting	  them	  the	  right	  to	  residence.	  Most	  nations	  feel	  that	  
they	  ought	  to	  help	  refugees	  and	  that	  it	  would	  be	  wrong	  simply	  to	  let	  them	  die	  of	  
starvation	  or	  exposure,	  but	  few	  see	  it	  as	  a	  moral,	  political,	  or	  legal	  obligation	  except	  
in	  the	  most	  minimal	  sense.	  The	  US,	  for	  example,	  firmly	  asserts	  that	  its	  policies	  
concerning	  refugees	  are	  not	  rooted	  in	  the	  fulfillment	  of	  any	  international	  obligation	  
but	  ought	  to	  be	  understood	  as	  “an	  exceptional	  ex	  gratia	  act	  provided	  by	  the	  United	  
States	  in	  furthering	  foreign	  and	  humanitarian	  policies.”7	  Given	  this,	  Arendt’s	  
fundamental	  critique	  of	  the	  way	  stateless	  people	  are	  treated	  when	  they	  are	  outside	  
of	  their	  state	  remains	  true:	  “the	  prolongation	  of	  their	  lives	  is	  due	  to	  charity	  and	  not	  
to	  right,	  for	  no	  law	  exists	  which	  could	  force	  the	  nations	  to	  feed	  them”	  (Arendt	  1978,	  
296).	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  The	  title	  of	  a	  recent	  book	  of	  the	  subject	  is	  telling:	  Are	  There	  Human	  Rights	  For	  
Migrants?	  (Dembour	  and	  Kelly,	  2011).	  For	  a	  more	  Arendtian	  analysis,	  see	  Gündogdu	  
2012	  (also	  see	  her	  forthcoming	  article,	  “Rightlessness	  in	  an	  Age	  of	  Rights”).	  
Klabbers	  notes	  that	  one	  reason	  for	  this	  continuing	  precarious	  situation	  is	  that	  
neither	  “the	  1951	  Refugee	  Convention	  nor	  the	  1967	  Protocol	  thereto	  provide	  
anything	  by	  way	  of	  political	  rights”	  (Klabbers	  2012,	  244).	  
7	  From	  the	  1980	  US	  Refugee	  Act	  (quoted	  in	  Singer	  and	  Singer	  1988,	  116).	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To	  summarize,	  Arendt’s	  first	  critique	  of	  statelessness	  is	  that	  it	  entails	  the	  loss	  
of	  a	  political	  community,	  and	  it	  is	  only	  within	  this	  political	  community	  that	  human	  
rights	  can	  be	  protected.	  Despite	  over	  50	  years	  of	  changes	  in	  international	  law	  and	  
human	  rights	  conventions	  around	  stateless	  people	  and	  refugees,	  their	  rights	  –	  both	  
legal	  and	  human	  –	  remain	  fundamentally	  precarious	  outside	  the	  nation-­‐state.	  
Though	  this	  is	  a	  crucial	  point	  in	  understanding	  statelessness,	  it	  this	  is	  not	  Arendt’s	  
most	  fundamental	  critique	  of	  statelessness.	  If	  this	  were	  the	  only	  harm	  of	  
statelessness,	  we	  might	  say	  that	  the	  ethics	  of	  admissions	  is	  sufficient	  to	  deal	  with	  it.	  
However	  this	  is	  not	  the	  case.	  As	  I	  argue	  below,	  Arendt	  demonstrated	  that	  there	  is	  a	  
much	  more	  fundamental	  loss	  that	  comes	  with	  statelessness.	  I	  refer	  to	  this	  loss	  as	  the	  
ontological	  deprivation.	  	  
	  
Part	  III:	  The	  Ontological	  Deprivation	  
In	  this	  section,	  I	  turn	  to	  Arendt’s	  analysis	  of	  the	  ontological	  deprivation	  and	  
argue	  that	  it	  has	  three	  different	  dimensions:	  the	  loss	  of	  identity	  and	  reduction	  to	  
bare	  life;	  the	  expulsion	  from	  common	  humanity	  and	  inability	  to	  speak	  and	  act	  
meaningfully;	  and	  finally,	  the	  loss	  of	  agency	  understood	  not	  as	  a	  subjective	  
disposition,	  but	  an	  ability	  to	  have	  your	  words	  and	  actions	  be	  recognized	  as	  
meaningful	  and	  politically	  relevant.	  After	  explaining	  these	  in	  some	  detail,	  I	  address	  
the	  criticism	  that	  Arendt	  does	  not	  adequately	  describe	  the	  experience	  of	  stateless	  
people	  and	  gives	  insufficient	  weight	  to	  their	  agency.	  I	  show	  that	  with	  a	  nuanced	  
understanding	  of	  Arendt’s	  conception	  of	  action,	  this	  objection	  does	  not	  hold	  and	  
Arendt	  can	  and	  ought	  to	  be	  used	  to	  ground	  our	  understanding	  of	  statelessness.	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Bare	  Life	  and	  Individual	  Identity	  
One	  aspect	  of	  statelessness	  that	  Arendt	  was	  the	  first	  to	  notice	  is	  the	  way	  in	  
which	  this	  process	  transformed	  a	  person’s	  identity.	  This	  transformation	  had	  two	  
dimensions	  –	  it	  both	  deprived	  a	  person	  of	  their	  former	  identities	  and	  replaced	  them	  
with	  new	  ones.	  In	  her	  words,	  statelessness	  deprived	  a	  person	  “of	  all	  clearly	  
established,	  officially	  recognized	  identity”	  (Arendt	  1978,	  287;	  italics	  added).	  This	  
was	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  most	  common	  complaint	  of	  refugees,	  from	  all	  levels	  of	  society,	  
that	  “nobody	  here	  knows	  who	  I	  am”	  (Arendt	  1978,	  287).8	  The	  loss	  of	  a	  unique	  
personal	  identity	  came	  hand	  in	  hand	  with	  being	  given	  a	  new	  identity	  –	  that	  of	  a	  
human	  being	  in	  general,	  “without	  a	  profession,	  without	  a	  citizenship,	  without	  an	  
opinion,	  without	  a	  deed	  by	  which	  to	  identify	  and	  specify	  himself”	  (Arendt	  1978,	  
302).	  Stateless	  people	  appeared	  to	  the	  outside	  world	  as	  “nothing	  but	  human	  beings,”	  
entirely	  innocent	  and	  without	  responsibility	  (Arendt	  1978,	  295).	  	  
Importantly,	  this	  new	  identity	  rooted	  in	  our	  humanness	  did	  not	  give	  rise	  to	  
respect,	  awe,	  or	  humanitarian	  sentiment	  as	  Enlightenment	  thinkers	  thought	  it	  
would	  but	  quite	  the	  opposite:	  “the	  world	  found	  nothing	  sacred	  in	  the	  abstract	  
nakedness	  of	  being	  human”	  (Arendt	  1978,	  299).	  According	  to	  the	  traditional	  
understanding	  of	  human	  rights,	  if	  a	  human	  being	  loses	  her	  political	  status,	  she	  
should	  be	  able	  to	  fall	  back	  on	  her	  natural,	  inalienable	  human	  rights.	  “Actually	  the	  
opposite	  is	  the	  case,”	  writes	  Arendt.	  “It	  seems	  that	  a	  man	  who	  is	  nothing	  but	  a	  man	  
has	  lost	  the	  very	  qualities	  which	  make	  it	  possible	  for	  other	  people	  to	  treat	  him	  as	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  This	  is	  a	  sentiment	  that	  Arendt	  reported	  in	  her	  own	  biographical	  account	  of	  life	  as	  
a	  refugee	  in	  “We	  Refugees”	  (Arendt	  2008).	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fellow-­‐man”	  (Arendt	  1978,	  300).	  In	  other	  words,	  to	  be	  purely	  human	  is	  actually	  to	  
be	  less	  than	  human	  or	  at	  least,	  to	  be	  human	  in	  a	  way	  that	  people	  cannot	  recognize.	  	  
	   Why	  is	  this	  necessarily	  the	  case?	  Arendt	  was	  the	  first	  to	  observe	  that	  once	  a	  
person	  is	  stripped	  of	  her	  political	  persona	  and	  citizenship,	  she	  appears	  as	  an	  
abstract	  human	  being	  who,	  precisely	  because	  of	  this	  abstraction,	  does	  not	  appear	  to	  
be	  fully	  human.	  Taking	  up	  this	  idea,	  Giorgio	  Agamben	  developed	  the	  concept	  of	  
“bare	  life”	  to	  describe	  precisely	  what	  Arendt	  was	  referring	  to.9	  For	  Agamben,	  bare	  
life	  refers	  to	  the	  separation	  of	  biological	  life	  from	  political	  existence.	  Agamben	  
claims	  that	  the	  original	  foundation	  of	  politics	  is	  the	  exclusion	  of	  bare	  life.	  This	  can	  be	  
traced	  to	  Aristotle’s	  distinction	  between	  two	  fundamental	  kinds	  of	  life:	  zoë,	  the	  
biological	  life	  that	  we	  share	  in	  common	  with	  animals,	  and	  bios,	  the	  kind	  of	  life	  that	  is	  
distinctive	  to	  human	  beings,	  embodied	  in	  our	  political	  capacities	  for	  speech	  and	  
action.	  Aristotle	  argued	  that	  zoë,	  biological	  life,	  ought	  to	  be	  excluded	  from	  the	  polis	  
since	  politics	  was	  concerned	  with	  what	  was	  distinctly	  human.	  For	  Agamben,	  though	  
the	  relationship	  between	  bare	  life	  and	  political	  life	  is	  complicated	  in	  modernity,	  bare	  
life	  still	  cannot	  be	  part	  of	  political	  life	  and	  must	  remain	  separated	  from	  the	  polis.	  He	  
gives	  an	  account	  for	  why	  the	  modern	  nation-­‐state,	  premised	  on	  the	  separation	  of	  
bios	  and	  zoë,	  is	  incapable	  of	  dealing	  with	  stateless	  people	  who	  have	  become	  
“nothing	  but	  human”	  and	  must	  keep	  them	  in	  a	  permanent	  state	  of	  exclusion.	  10	  This	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  That	  Agamben’s	  concept	  of	  bare	  life	  is	  the	  necessary	  consequence	  of	  Arendt’s	  view	  
of	  statelessness	  is	  a	  position	  also	  held	  by	  Jacques	  Rancière.	  For	  him,	  “the	  radical	  
suspension	  of	  politics	  in	  the	  exception	  of	  bare	  life	  is	  the	  ultimate	  consequence	  of	  
Arendt’s	  archipolitical	  position”	  (Rancière	  2004,	  301).	  
10	  That	  refugees	  and	  stateless	  people	  are	  exemplars	  of	  bare	  life	  has	  been	  much	  
discussed	  in	  recent	  years.	  For	  examples	  of	  scholars	  using	  Agamben	  to	  discuss	  the	  
problem	  of	  refugees	  and	  statelessness	  see	  Basaran	  2008,	  Coleman	  and	  Grove	  2009,	  	  
Draft – Please do note cite without permission 
 16 
is	  why	  he	  argues	  that,	  “there	  is	  no	  autonomous	  space	  in	  the	  political	  order	  of	  the	  
nation-­‐state	  for	  something	  like	  the	  pure	  human	  itself”	  (Agamben	  1998,	  20).	  11	  	  
Taking	  his	  cue	  from	  Agamben	  and	  Arendt,	  the	  French	  anthropologist,	  Michel	  
Agier,	  documents	  the	  way	  that	  bare	  life	  manifests	  itself	  in	  the	  current	  refugee	  
regime.	  As	  he	  puts	  it,	  refugees	  	  “are	  certainly	  alive,	  but	  they	  no	  longer	  'exist',	  that	  is,	  
they	  no	  longer	  have	  a	  social	  or	  political	  existence	  apart	  from	  their	  biological	  one"	  
(Agier	  2008,	  49).	  This	  is	  in	  part	  because	  of	  the	  rationale	  for	  the	  existence	  of	  
humanitarian	  agencies	  –	  they	  are	  supposed	  to	  protect	  people	  qua	  human	  being,	  not	  
qua	  particular	  identity.	  Stateless	  people	  must	  assume	  the	  standpoint	  of	  bare	  life	  in	  
order	  to	  receive	  aid.	  Indeed,	  refugees	  can	  only	  make	  claims	  for	  humanitarian	  aid	  and	  
protection	  as	  bare	  life,	  or	  more	  specifically,	  bare	  life	  in	  need	  of	  protection	  as	  victims.	  
With	  the	  loss	  of	  identity	  and	  reduction	  to	  victimhood,	  aid	  can	  come	  from	  states	  or	  
regions	  that	  may	  be	  either	  friendly	  or	  hostile.	  Humanitarian	  aid	  thus	  requires	  the	  
“social	  and	  political	  non-­‐existence	  of	  the	  beneficiaries	  of	  aid”	  (Agier	  2011,	  133).	  
Rather	  than	  being	  political	  subjects,	  they	  become	  objects	  of	  humanitarian	  aid,	  bodies	  
to	  be	  cared	  for	  and	  protected.	  	  
In	  sum,	  the	  first	  aspect	  of	  the	  ontological	  deprivation	  is	  that	  stateless	  people	  
are	  turned	  into	  human	  beings	  in	  general	  and	  bodies	  to	  be	  cared	  for,	  rather	  than	  
retaining	  their	  status	  as	  individuals	  with	  unique	  identities	  or	  political	  subjects	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Doty	  2007,	  Hagmann	  and	  Korf	  2012,	  Jennings	  2011,	  Jenkins	  2004	  and	  Owens	  2009.	  	  
11	  To	  be	  clear,	  I	  do	  not	  mean	  to	  suggest	  that	  we	  follow	  Agamben’s	  analysis	  
concerning	  refugees	  to	  its	  conclusion.	  For	  one,	  as	  this	  statement	  indicates,	  Agamben	  
leaves	  no	  room	  for	  the	  limited	  but	  still	  present	  agency	  of	  people	  rendered	  bare	  life.	  
Owens	  (2009)	  argues	  persuasively	  that	  he	  takes	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  refugee	  as	  bare	  life	  too	  
far.	  I	  do,	  however,	  want	  to	  argue	  that	  his	  development	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  bare	  life	  and	  
the	  relation	  of	  abandonment	  remain	  important	  concepts	  in	  helping	  us	  develop	  a	  
fuller	  understanding	  of	  statelessness	  in	  the	  modern	  world.	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whose	  particular	  existence	  matters.	  This	  ontological	  deprivation	  is	  solidified	  in	  the	  
political	  structure	  such	  that	  humanitarian	  aid	  is	  only	  available	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  this	  
transformation.	  	  
	  
Rejection	  from	  the	  Common	  World	  and	  Abandonment	  
	   The	  second	  dimension	  of	  the	  ontological	  deprivation	  has	  to	  do	  with	  the	  exile	  
from	  the	  common	  world	  that	  comes	  with	  statelessness.	  For	  many,	  refugee	  camps	  are	  
a	  matter	  of	  practical	  necessity	  –	  there	  is	  nowhere	  else	  to	  put	  large	  groups	  of	  
unwanted	  people;	  they	  are	  pragmatically,	  politically,	  and	  economically	  necessary.	  
Yet	  for	  Arendt,	  I	  argue,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  see	  these	  camps	  as	  morally	  problematic	  
because	  they	  effectively	  exclude	  people	  from	  what	  she	  referred	  to	  as	  “the	  common	  
world.”	  This	  expulsion	  from	  the	  common	  world	  is	  a	  fundamental	  aspect	  of	  the	  
ontological	  deprivation.	  To	  further	  nuance	  this	  idea,	  I	  argue	  that	  we	  must	  
understand	  this	  exclusion	  from	  the	  common	  world	  as	  a	  form	  of	  abandonment,	  with	  
both	  ontological	  and	  political	  dimensions.	  I	  draw	  on	  Agamben’s	  use	  of	  this	  term	  and	  
show	  that	  for	  him,	  abandonment	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  stateless	  people	  are	  left	  on	  
their	  own,	  but	  rather	  that	  they	  remain	  directly	  impacted	  by	  us	  through	  their	  formal	  
exclusion.	  Their	  very	  identities	  and	  modes	  of	  existence	  are	  defined	  almost	  entirely	  
by	  their	  exclusion.	  Agamben	  terms	  this	  form	  of	  abandonment	  as	  the	  inclusive	  
exclusion.	  Both	  these	  aspect	  are	  important	  to	  understand	  the	  ontological	  harm	  of	  
statelessness.	  
	   Politically	  speaking,	  stateless	  people	  are	  forced	  outside	  of	  our	  common	  
political	  community.	  As	  Agier	  puts	  it,	  refugees	  are	  often	  physically	  out	  side	  of	  the	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geographically	  recognized	  world.	  Refugee	  camps,	  for	  example,	  are	  often	  not	  even	  on	  
maps	  through	  they	  may	  have	  existed	  for	  a	  decade	  or	  longer.12	  Stateless	  people	  are	  
economically	  outside	  the	  common	  world,	  since	  the	  stateless	  are	  not	  permitted	  to	  
engage	  in	  the	  global	  economy	  except	  through	  being	  passive	  recipients	  of,	  and	  
entirely	  dependent	  on,	  the	  world’s	  charity	  for	  their	  minimal	  biological	  existence.	  
Finally	  they	  are	  socially	  and	  politically	  outside	  the	  common	  world,	  since	  they	  are	  
denied	  social	  integration	  and	  political	  rights	  or	  agency	  in	  the	  states	  where	  they	  
reside	  (Agier	  2008).	  Since	  refugees	  are	  not	  permitted	  to	  integrate	  into	  the	  
communities	  where	  they	  reside	  and	  very	  few	  are	  ever	  resettled,	  stateless	  people	  
spend	  the	  duration	  of	  their	  lives	  outside	  of	  any	  social	  or	  political	  community	  and	  
thus	  are	  effectively	  excluded	  from	  the	  common	  realm.	  	  
	   For	  Arendt,	  this	  physical,	  economic,	  social	  and	  political	  exclusion	  has	  an	  extra	  
dimension	  –	  taken	  together,	  they	  represent	  the	  exclusion	  of	  stateless	  people	  from	  
the	  “common	  world,”	  participation	  in	  which	  is	  necessary	  for	  our	  humanity.	  This	  
exclusion	  constitutes	  part	  of	  the	  ontological	  deprivation	  because	  this	  means	  that	  an	  
individual	  loses	  her	  place	  in	  a	  common	  public	  space	  from	  which	  action,	  speech,	  and	  
hence	  identity	  become	  meaningful.	  For	  her,	  the	  common	  world	  “is	  not	  identical	  with	  
the	  earth	  or	  with	  nature…It	  is	  related,	  rather,	  to	  the	  human	  artifact,	  the	  fabrication	  
of	  human	  hands,	  as	  well	  as	  to	  affairs	  which	  go	  on	  among	  those	  who	  inhabit	  the	  man-­‐
made	  world	  together”	  (Arendt	  1998,	  52).	  The	  common	  world	  is	  (at	  times)	  
synonymous	  with	  the	  public	  realm	  which	  “gathers	  us	  together	  and	  yet	  prevents	  our	  
falling	  over	  each	  other”	  (Arendt	  1998,	  52).	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  common	  world	  is	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12	  See	  Bauman	  2007,	  38	  for	  examples	  of	  this.	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both	  what	  relates	  us	  to	  each	  other	  as	  being	  who	  must	  share	  the	  same	  worldly	  space,	  
and	  separates	  us	  from	  each	  other	  and	  allows	  us	  to	  maintain	  our	  individual	  
identities.	  In	  the	  sense,	  the	  common	  world	  is	  the	  ground	  of	  plurality,	  our	  uniqueness	  
and	  difference	  that	  is	  so	  fundamental	  to	  politics.	  
Having	  been	  excluded	  from	  this	  realm	  of	  shared	  meaning,	  experience,	  and	  
fabrication,	  stateless	  people	  have	  a	  kind	  of	  worldlessness,	  and	  are	  uprooted	  and	  
rendered	  superfluous.	  She	  writes	  that	  to	  be	  “uprooted	  means	  to	  have	  no	  place	  in	  the	  
world,	  recognized	  and	  guaranteed	  by	  others;	  to	  be	  superfluous	  means	  not	  to	  belong	  
to	  the	  world	  at	  all.	  Uprootedness	  can	  be	  the	  preliminary	  condition	  of	  
superfluousness”	  (Arendt	  1978,	  475).	  To	  be	  rendered	  superfluous	  means	  that	  you	  
cease	  to	  matter	  to	  the	  world	  and	  cease	  to	  be	  able	  to	  affect	  the	  world	  in	  a	  meaningful	  
way.	  She	  writes	  that	  when	  a	  stateless	  person	  represents	  “nothing	  but	  his	  own	  
absolutely	  unique	  individuality,”	  this	  individuality	  loses	  significance	  because	  it	  is	  
deprived	  of	  “expression	  within	  and	  action	  upon	  a	  common	  world”	  (Arendt	  1978,	  
302).	  
In	  short,	  for	  Arendt,	  to	  be	  excluded	  physically,	  economically,	  socially,	  and	  
politically,	  as	  stateless	  people	  are,	  from	  the	  common	  world	  constitutes	  part	  of	  the	  
ontological	  deprivation	  because	  with	  this	  comes	  the	  loss	  of	  an	  individual	  place	  in	  a	  
common	  public	  space	  from	  which	  action,	  speech,	  and	  hence	  identity	  become	  
meaningful.	  It	  is	  the	  loss	  of	  the	  ground	  from	  which	  one	  can	  engage	  meaningfully	  
with	  others	  and	  with	  the	  world	  that	  is	  shared	  in	  common.	  
	   The	  exclusion	  from	  the	  common	  world	  and	  the	  worldlessness	  of	  stateless	  
people	  constitutes	  the	  ontological	  deprivation	  in	  a	  second	  way,	  described	  by	  
Draft – Please do note cite without permission 
 20 
Agamben.	  For	  Agamben,	  being	  excluded	  from	  the	  common	  realm	  means	  that	  
stateless	  people	  remain	  in	  a	  state	  of	  abandonment.	  Because	  modern	  nation	  states	  
cannot	  deal	  politically	  with	  bare	  life,	  they	  are	  forced	  to	  keep	  it	  outside	  of	  political	  
life	  in	  what	  he	  refers	  to	  as	  a	  state	  of	  abandonment.	  To	  be	  abandoned	  for	  Agamben	  
does	  not	  mean	  that	  states	  simply	  put	  aside	  stateless	  people	  and	  no	  longer	  have	  
anything	  to	  do	  with	  them.	  Rather,	  in	  Agamben’s	  analysis,	  states	  remain	  in	  a	  
relationship	  with	  what	  that	  they	  have	  abandoned	  in	  the	  form	  of	  an	  inclusive	  
exclusion.	  States	  formally	  exclude	  stateless	  people	  as	  non-­‐citizens,	  yet	  stateless	  
people	  remain	  dependent	  upon	  a	  given	  state	  both	  for	  their	  material	  needs	  (recall	  
that	  since	  they	  are	  formally	  excluded	  from	  economic	  activities,	  they	  are	  reliant	  on	  
the	  international	  community	  and	  their	  states	  of	  residence	  for	  all	  material	  goods),	  as	  
well	  as	  their	  identities.	  They	  are	  defined	  by	  their	  exclusion	  –	  as	  either	  refugees,	  
asylum	  seekers,	  failed	  asylum	  seekers,	  economic	  migrants,	  etc.	  –	  and	  this	  definition	  
has	  a	  direct	  bearing	  of	  their	  chances	  for	  survival	  and	  integration.	  In	  this	  sense,	  to	  say	  
that	  stateless	  people	  are	  abandoned	  by	  humanity	  is	  not	  simply	  to	  say	  that	  they	  are	  
left	  alone;	  rather,	  they	  continue	  to	  exist	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  other	  entities	  –	  developed	  
countries,	  developing	  countries,	  the	  UNHCR,	  other	  NGOs	  –	  through	  their	  
vulnerability	  and	  dependence	  on	  them,	  both	  for	  their	  material	  needs	  and	  their	  
status	  and	  definition.	  Stateless	  people	  are	  excluded	  as	  members	  of	  a	  given	  state	  but	  
included	  by	  virtue	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  receive	  their	  identity	  and	  status	  via	  this	  
exclusion.	  	  
	   	  
	  
Draft – Please do note cite without permission 
 21 
Speech,	  Action,	  and	  the	  Thorny	  Question	  of	  Agency	  
	   In	  this	  paper,	  I	  have	  argued	  that	  the	  harm	  of	  statelessness	  occurs	  on	  two	  
levels	  –	  the	  legal/political	  and	  the	  ontological.	  Thus	  far,	  we	  have	  seen	  that	  the	  
ontological	  deprivation	  consists	  in	  a	  transformation	  in	  identity	  from	  individual	  
citizen	  to	  human	  being	  in	  general	  or	  “bare	  life,”	  and	  the	  effective	  removal	  of	  
stateless	  people	  from	  the	  common	  realm	  of	  humanity	  and	  abandonment.	  There	  is	  
one	  more	  crucial	  element	  in	  the	  ontological	  deprivation	  that	  arises	  directly	  as	  a	  
result	  of	  the	  first	  two	  transformations:	  statelessness	  diminishes	  a	  person’s	  ability	  to	  
speak	  and	  act	  in	  a	  meaningful	  way.	  In	  this	  sense,	  a	  stateless	  person	  has	  her	  political	  
agency	  diminished,	  her	  ability	  to	  act	  in	  the	  specific	  Arendtian	  sense	  of	  the	  term,	  as	  
the	  freedom	  to	  act	  with	  others	  and	  have	  actions	  and	  speech	  recognized	  as	  
meaningful.	  	  
Action	  for	  Arendt	  is	  connected	  to	  plurality,	  the	  fact	  that	  as	  human	  we	  are	  
both	  alike	  in	  fundamental	  ways,	  and	  different.	  This	  urge	  to	  assert	  our	  difference	  
within	  equality	  is	  the	  ontological	  root	  of	  action.	  This	  is	  why	  for	  Arendt	  it	  is	  only	  
through	  action	  (rather	  than	  labor	  or	  work)	  that	  we	  reveal	  who	  we	  are	  as	  individuals	  
and	  are	  able	  to	  mark	  our	  place	  in	  the	  world.	  Arendt	  often	  speaks	  as	  though	  action	  
and	  speech	  were	  the	  same	  thing	  because	  they	  both,	  “contain	  the	  answer	  to	  the	  
question	  asked	  of	  every	  newcomer:	  ‘Who	  are	  you?”	  (Arendt	  1998,	  178).	  In	  action	  
and	  speech,	  “men	  show	  who	  they	  are,	  reveal	  actively	  their	  unique	  personal	  
identities	  and	  thus	  make	  their	  appearance	  in	  a	  human	  world”	  (Arendt	  1998,	  179).	  In	  
this	  sense,	  action	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  an	  existential	  achievement,	  something	  to	  be	  
accomplished	  in	  a	  human	  life.	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Yet	  action	  is	  similarly	  a	  basic	  human	  capacity	  that	  is	  rooted	  in	  natality,	  the	  
fact	  that	  we	  are	  beings	  who	  are	  by	  nature	  beginners.	  In	  this	  sense	  of	  the	  term,	  action	  
is	  not	  an	  achievement	  but	  a	  fundamental	  human	  capacity.	  To	  act	  in	  the	  most	  general	  
sense	  means	  to	  begin,	  to	  set	  something	  into	  motion	  that	  can	  neither	  be	  predicted	  
nor	  controlled.	  Action	  thus	  is	  “unexpected”	  and	  the	  “fact	  that	  man	  is	  capable	  of	  
action	  means	  that	  the	  unexpected	  can	  be	  expected	  from	  him,	  that	  he	  is	  able	  to	  
perform	  what	  is	  infinitely	  improbable”	  (Arendt	  1998,	  178).	  This	  aspect	  of	  action	  is	  
crucial	  because	  it	  demonstrates	  that	  Arendt	  is	  committed	  to	  the	  idea	  that	  even	  in	  the	  
worst	  conditions	  –	  whether	  it	  be	  refugee	  camps	  today	  or	  concentration	  camps	  in	  the	  
past	  –	  humans	  retain	  this	  powerful	  and	  surprising	  capacity	  to	  act	  and	  to	  begin.	  
Action’s	  power	  to	  disclose	  human	  identity	  is	  connected	  with	  another	  
fundamental	  feature	  of	  action:	  to	  act	  and	  to	  be	  free	  are	  the	  same	  thing.	  “Men	  are	  
free,”	  writes	  Arendt,	  “as	  long	  as	  they	  act,	  neither	  before	  nor	  after;	  for	  to	  be	  free	  and	  
to	  act	  are	  the	  same”	  (Arendt	  1993,	  153).	  This	  aspect	  of	  Arendt’s	  thought	  is	  often	  
jarring	  to	  contemporary	  readers	  who	  understand	  freedom	  as	  the	  an	  inner	  
disposition	  or	  subjective	  state	  connected	  to	  the	  will,	  where	  I	  am	  free	  when	  I	  can	  do	  
what	  I	  will	  or	  desire	  to	  do.	  Freedom	  is	  not	  a	  subjective	  state	  or	  inner	  disposition	  for	  
Arendt.	  For	  her,	  freedom	  is	  a	  fundamental	  human	  experience	  that	  is	  actualized	  
primarily	  in	  political	  action,	  where	  a	  person	  discloses	  their	  uniqueness	  in	  
conjunction	  with	  other	  people.	  Freedom,	  writes	  Arendt,	  “is	  actually	  the	  reason	  that	  
men	  live	  together	  in	  political	  organization	  at	  all.	  Without	  it,	  political	  life	  as	  such	  
would	  be	  meaningless”	  (Arendt	  1993,	  146).	  Action	  is	  by	  definition	  intersubjective	  in	  
that	  it	  requires	  the	  presence	  and	  recognition	  of	  others	  in	  a	  common,	  public	  realm.	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“Without	  a	  politically	  guaranteed	  public	  realm,	  freedom	  lacks	  the	  worldly	  space	  to	  
make	  its	  appearance”	  (Arendt	  1993,	  149).	  
	   Given	  Arendt’s	  understanding	  of	  action,	  and	  its	  connection	  to	  freedom	  and	  
the	  public	  realm,	  it	  is	  not	  surprising	  that	  the	  fundamental	  harm	  of	  statelessness	  is	  
that	  it	  diminishes	  a	  person’s	  ability	  to	  speak	  and	  act	  in	  a	  meaningful	  way.	  This	  
occurs	  in	  several	  ways.	  First,	  because	  they	  are	  outside	  of	  the	  common	  world	  they	  
lack	  a	  reliable,	  durable	  space	  in	  which	  their	  actions	  can	  be	  seen	  and	  words	  
understood.	  Recall	  that	  for	  Arendt,	  without	  “a	  politically	  guaranteed	  public	  realm,	  
freedom	  lacks	  the	  worldly	  space	  to	  make	  its	  appearance”	  (Arendt	  1993,	  149).	  This	  is	  
not	  to	  say	  that	  Arendt	  believe	  that	  action	  can	  only	  occur	  in	  an	  institutionalized	  
public	  setting	  or	  that	  only	  citizens	  can	  act.	  For	  Arendt,	  action	  requires	  a	  “space	  of	  
appearance”	  (Arendt	  1998,	  199)	  and	  this	  emerges	  when	  people	  come	  together	  to	  
act.	  Within	  these	  minimal	  conditions,	  stateless	  people	  and	  refugees	  do	  act	  and	  
speak.	  But	  what	  is	  lost	  with	  statelessness	  is	  the	  reliability	  and	  durability	  of	  a	  space	  
of	  appearance	  that	  is	  “politically	  guaranteed.”	  Without	  this	  space,	  there	  is	  not	  
consistently	  a	  public	  to	  acknowledge	  and	  judge	  their	  actions	  as	  meaningful.	  Without	  
these,	  the	  political	  action	  of	  refugees	  and	  stateless	  people	  is	  possible	  and	  does	  occur	  
in	  exceptional	  circumstances,	  but	  lacks	  the	  conditions	  that	  make	  action	  consistently	  
meaningful.	  
This	  is	  why	  Arendt	  insists	  that	  stateless	  people	  are	  in	  a	  fundamental	  
condition	  of	  rightlessness	  even	  though	  they	  have	  certain	  rights	  in	  principle,	  such	  as	  
freedom	  of	  expression	  or	  opinion.	  Without	  a	  political	  community,	  regardless	  of	  
whether	  one	  is	  able	  to	  say	  what	  they	  think	  and	  believe,	  opinions	  and	  actions	  cease	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to	  matter.	  So	  fundamental	  is	  the	  intersubjective	  nature	  of	  speech	  and	  action	  that	  
Arendt	  defines	  the	  most	  fundamental	  right,	  the	  right	  to	  have	  rights,	  as	  the	  right	  “to	  
live	  in	  a	  framework	  where	  one	  is	  judged	  by	  one’s	  actions	  and	  opinion”	  (Arendt	  1978,	  
296,	  italics	  added).	  Conversely,	  the	  deprivation	  of	  human	  rights,	  “is	  manifested	  first	  
and	  above	  all	  in	  the	  deprivation	  of	  a	  place	  in	  the	  world	  which	  makes	  opinions	  
significant	  and	  actions	  effective”	  (Arendt	  1978,	  296).	  One	  no	  longer	  has	  a	  common	  
public	  realm	  to	  give	  one’s	  actions	  and	  identity	  meaning.	  To	  be	  sure,	  its	  not	  that	  
stateless	  people	  are	  no	  longer	  capable	  of	  speech	  and	  action	  but	  rather,	  in	  their	  
condition	  of	  rightlessness,	  it	  becomes	  hard	  if	  not	  impossible	  to	  recognize	  their	  
words	  and	  actions	  as	  meaningful.13	  In	  Hayden’s	  words,	  the	  problem	  with	  
statelessness	  is	  that	  stateless	  people	  are	  at	  risk	  of	  “becoming	  irrelevant	  to	  the	  world	  
in	  that	  their	  actions	  and	  opinions	  no	  longer	  matter	  to	  anyone”	  (Hayden	  2010,	  65).	  	  	  
	   I	  want	  to	  stress	  that	  for	  Arendt,	  the	  ontological	  deprivation	  is	  such	  a	  
fundamental	  loss	  not	  because	  it	  means	  that	  a	  person	  can	  no	  longer	  speak	  or	  act,	  but	  
because	  they	  are	  no	  longer	  judged	  by	  their	  words	  and	  deeds	  and	  are	  judged	  instead	  
according	  to	  what	  is	  “merely	  given”	  about	  their	  existence	  –	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  are	  
human	  beings	  in	  general	  and	  bodies	  in	  need	  of	  protection.	  Because	  action	  is	  rooted	  
in	  natality,	  it	  remains	  a	  fundamental	  human	  capacity	  even	  in	  the	  most	  extreme	  
conditions;	  yet	  because	  speech	  and	  action	  are	  intersubjective,	  they	  require	  the	  
presence	  and	  recognition	  of	  others.	  To	  be	  without	  a	  meaningful	  public	  persona	  and	  
public	  stage	  on	  which	  to	  appear,	  stateless	  people	  are	  judged	  not	  according	  to	  their	  
actions	  and	  opinions	  –	  according	  to	  “who”	  they	  are	  –	  but	  according	  to	  how	  they	  are	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	  Rancière	  takes	  up	  this	  point	  and	  argues	  that	  politics	  is	  precisely	  about	  deciding	  
what	  counts	  as	  genuine	  political	  speech	  and	  what	  is	  mere	  noise	  (Rancière	  2004).	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seen	  by	  others	  –	  according	  to	  “what”	  they	  are.	  This	  is	  why	  stateless	  people	  can	  be	  
treated	  as	  bare	  life,	  as	  a	  body	  without	  a	  meaningful	  identity,	  a	  life	  to	  be	  cared	  for	  
indistinguishable	  from	  other	  suffering	  bodies.	  	  
I	  have	  argued	  above	  for	  a	  nuanced	  reading	  of	  Arendt’s	  discussion	  of	  
statelessness	  as	  an	  ontological	  deprivation,	  taking	  seriously	  the	  ontological	  root	  of	  
action	  in	  natality	  that	  stateless	  people	  retain	  even	  while	  they	  lose	  other	  important	  
criteria	  for	  action,	  such	  as	  a	  durable	  public	  space	  and	  community	  to	  judge	  the	  action	  
and	  speech	  as	  meaningful.	  I	  turn	  now	  to	  a	  common	  objection	  leveled	  against	  
Arendt’s	  view	  of	  statelessness:	  that	  it	  fails	  to	  adequately	  represent	  the	  agency	  of	  
refugees	  and	  stateless	  people	  and	  thus	  her	  position	  is	  too	  extreme	  a	  critique	  of	  
statelessness.	  This	  criticism	  is	  made	  in	  a	  few	  different	  ways.	  	  
A	  first	  criticism	  is	  based	  in	  what	  many	  people	  know	  about	  refugee	  camps:	  
namely,	  that	  in	  many	  cases,	  they	  are	  breeding	  grounds	  for	  various	  forms	  of	  political	  
violence.	  Hamas	  in	  the	  Palestinian	  territory,	  and	  the	  Interahamwe	  in	  Rwanda	  are	  all	  
examples	  of	  political	  agency	  exercised	  by	  refugees.	  Given	  this,	  it	  appears	  that	  Arendt	  
is	  overstating	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  refugees	  become	  bare	  life	  and	  cease	  to	  be	  political	  
agents.	  A	  second	  criticism	  comes	  from	  people	  working	  in	  refugee	  camps	  who	  note	  
that	  in	  these	  places,	  though	  life	  is	  difficult,	  refugees	  are	  able	  to	  build	  a	  relatively	  
“normal”	  life	  in	  the	  sense	  are	  able	  to	  have	  social	  and	  economic	  lives	  that	  are	  more	  
than	  just	  mere	  biological	  survival.14	  “It’s	  a	  life	  that,	  however	  makeshift,	  unpleasant,	  
or	  uncomfortable	  is	  stable	  and	  relatively	  predictable,	  and	  which	  makes	  sense”	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14	  See,	  for	  example,	  Nyers	  2006,	  Dunn	  and	  Cons	  2012,	  and	  Kraus	  2008.	  Even	  Agier,	  
despite	  his	  sympathy	  with	  Arendt	  and	  Agamben’s	  interpretation	  of	  the	  refugee	  
experience,	  also	  notes	  many	  way	  that	  refugees	  exercise	  agency	  in	  camps	  (Agier	  
2011).	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(Dunn	  and	  Cons,	  2012)15.	  Thus	  rather	  than	  being	  seen	  as	  devoid	  of	  agency,	  they	  
must	  be	  understood	  as	  exercising	  a	  “burdened	  agency”	  (Myers	  2012)	  in	  that	  though	  
they	  have	  to	  work	  within	  enormous	  constraints,	  they	  are	  still	  able	  to	  reassemble	  a	  
regular	  existence.	  
Finally,	  a	  similar	  but	  more	  philosophically	  grounded	  criticism	  can	  be	  found	  in	  
Jacques	  Rancière’s	  reading	  of	  Arendt.	  Rancière	  is	  critical	  of	  Arendt’s	  interpretation	  
of	  human	  rights	  as	  ending	  in	  “either	  a	  void	  or	  a	  tautology”	  (Rancière	  2004,	  302).	  If	  
human	  rights	  are	  the	  rights	  of	  citizens,	  then	  they	  are	  simply	  the	  rights	  of	  people	  who	  
already	  have	  rights,	  and	  thus	  a	  tautology.	  If	  they	  are	  the	  rights	  of	  the	  unpoliticized	  
person,	  the	  person	  who	  is	  “nothing	  but	  a	  human	  being”	  and	  thus	  without	  rights,	  then	  
they	  amount	  to	  nothing	  and	  are	  simply	  void.	  What	  he	  argues	  instead	  is	  that	  politics	  
is	  precisely	  about	  staging	  a	  dissensus	  (a	  dispute	  about	  what	  is	  given)	  over	  this	  exact	  
question.16	  Politics	  is	  about	  the	  back	  and	  forth	  between	  the	  first	  inscription	  of	  rights	  
and	  the	  dissensus	  where	  they	  are	  put	  to	  the	  test	  –	  and	  this	  is	  why	  they	  can	  be	  
invoked	  even	  in	  refugee	  camps	  (Rancière	  2004,	  305).	  “These	  [rights]	  are	  theirs	  
when	  they	  can	  do	  something	  with	  them	  to	  construct	  a	  dissensus	  against	  the	  denial	  
of	  rights	  they	  suffer.	  And	  there	  are	  always	  people	  among	  them	  who	  do	  it”	  (Rancière	  
2004,	  305-­‐6).	  In	  Schaap’s	  interpretation	  of	  Rancière,	  politics	  is	  precise	  the	  staging	  of	  
a	  dissensus	  in	  which	  those	  who	  are	  deemed	  to	  lack	  speech	  make	  themselves	  heard	  
as	  political	  animals	  (Schaap	  2011).	  In	  other	  words,	  Arendt	  is	  wrong	  to	  think	  that	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15	  This	  criticism	  is	  leveled	  by	  Dunn	  and	  Cons	  at	  Agamben’s	  understanding	  of	  
refugees	  as	  bare	  life,	  but	  applies	  to	  Arendt	  as	  well.	  
16	  In	  Rancière’s	  well-­‐known	  phrase,	  the	  Rights	  of	  Man	  are	  the	  rights	  of	  those	  who	  
have	  not	  the	  rights	  that	  they	  have	  and	  have	  the	  rights	  that	  they	  have	  not	  (Rancière	  
2004,	  302).	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stateless	  people	  lack	  agency.	  For	  Rancière,	  stateless	  people	  are	  able	  to	  stage	  a	  
dissensus	  to	  demand	  their	  rights	  and	  challenge	  the	  status	  quo,	  and	  thus	  can	  speak	  
and	  act	  in	  a	  very	  meaningful	  way.	  
In	  response	  to	  these	  critiques,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  note	  two	  things.	  First,	  they	  
are	  correct	  in	  their	  observation	  that	  in	  becoming	  stateless	  and	  “nothing	  but	  a	  human	  
being,”	  it	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  a	  stateless	  person	  becomes	  incapable	  of	  doing	  anything	  
meaningful	  or	  acting	  in	  important	  and	  powerful	  ways.	  Yet	  this	  capacity	  is	  part	  of	  
Arendt’s	  understanding	  of	  action.	  As	  I	  tried	  to	  stress	  above,	  action	  for	  Arendt	  is	  
rooted	  in	  natality,	  the	  very	  nature	  of	  our	  existence	  as	  creatures	  who	  are	  beginners.	  
Thus	  Arendt	  would	  agree	  with	  the	  authors	  above	  that	  many	  stateless	  people	  contest	  
this	  status,	  engage	  meaningfully	  and	  creatively	  with	  each	  other	  and	  the	  communities	  
that	  they	  find	  themselves	  in,	  and	  maintain	  agency	  in	  important	  ways.	  	  
What	  is	  so	  useful	  about	  Arendt’s	  framework,	  however,	  is	  that	  she	  is	  able	  to	  
explain	  how	  stateless	  people	  retain	  this	  fundamental	  capacity	  and	  are	  able	  to	  act	  
politically,	  yet	  why	  statelessness	  for	  the	  most	  part	  remains	  a	  fundamental	  
deprivation.	  Politically	  and	  publicly,	  stateless	  people	  are	  still	  for	  the	  most	  part	  
treated	  as	  bare	  life	  or	  “nothing	  but	  human”	  in	  that	  their	  words	  and	  deeds	  are	  often	  
not	  recognized	  as	  political	  or	  meaningful.	  Politically	  speaking,	  their	  words,	  opinion,	  
and	  actions	  still	  do	  not	  “matter,”	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  they	  are	  not	  consistently	  
acknowledged	  or	  valued	  by	  others	  –	  either	  by	  the	  humanitarian	  organizations	  that	  
care	  for	  and	  control	  them,	  nor	  by	  states	  where	  they	  reside	  or	  hope	  to	  reside.	  This	  is	  
evident	  in	  the	  ways	  that	  their	  interests	  are	  taken	  or	  failed	  to	  be	  taken	  into	  
consideration;	  the	  way	  that	  their	  claims	  are	  assessed	  in	  asylum	  hearings;	  and	  the	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more	  general	  way	  that	  stateless	  people	  are	  represented	  in	  our	  political	  landscape.	  
Though	  there	  are	  exceptions	  to	  this	  –	  people	  who	  are	  able	  to	  make	  themselves	  seen	  
and	  heard	  –	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  stateless	  people	  remain	  a	  “what,”	  a	  body	  to	  be	  cared	  
for,	  a	  life	  to	  be	  preserved,	  rather	  than	  a	  political	  subject.	  	  
For	  Arendt,	  what	  the	  ontological	  deprivation	  entails	  is	  that	  speech	  and	  action	  are	  
no	  longer	  meaningful,	  not	  to	  ourselves	  and	  those	  close	  to	  us,	  but	  to	  those	  who	  are	  
different	  from	  us	  and	  in	  front	  of	  whom	  we	  try	  to	  distinguish	  ourselves.	  In	  other	  
words,	  without	  a	  political	  persona,	  speech	  lacks	  meaning;	  it	  is	  a	  “fool’s	  freedom”	  
because	  it	  gains	  no	  recognition	  either	  from	  local	  NGOs,	  the	  UN,	  host	  states,	  or	  
Western	  states	  that	  may	  resettle	  them.	  What	  they	  have	  lost	  is	  action	  in	  the	  
Arendtian	  sense	  as	  self-­‐disclosive	  and	  world-­‐building.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  because	  
stateless	  people	  are	  seen	  merely	  as	  “what”	  they	  are	  –	  bodies	  to	  be	  cared	  for	  or	  
people	  who	  threaten	  the	  state	  –	  they	  are	  often	  considered	  to	  be	  liars	  who	  will	  say	  
anything	  to	  get	  into	  “our”	  country	  or	  take	  more	  resources.	  Their	  speech	  is	  thus	  
disvalued,	  dismissed,	  and	  certainly	  not	  seen	  as	  meaningful.	  Without	  a	  meaningful	  
political	  identity	  within	  the	  context	  of	  the	  common	  world,	  a	  fundamental	  dimension	  
of	  speaking	  and	  acting	  is	  lost.	  That	  is,	  under	  the	  condition	  of	  epistemic	  injustice	  –	  
where	  stateless	  people	  are	  not	  recognized	  as	  agents	  who	  speak	  meaningfully	  but	  as	  
objects	  to	  be	  cared	  for	  or	  protected,	  this	  capacity	  is	  precisely	  what	  is	  erased	  (though	  
never	  entirely	  eliminated).	  This	  is	  why	  the	  deprivation	  of	  statelessness	  is	  an	  
ontological	  deprivation	  –	  it	  deprives	  people	  precisely	  of	  this	  human	  capacity	  in	  a	  
fundamental,	  though	  never	  absolute,	  way.	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Let	  me	  draw	  on	  an	  example	  discussed	  by	  Didier	  Fassin	  to	  make	  this	  point	  
clearer.	  He	  tells	  the	  story	  of	  Marie,	  a	  Haitian	  woman	  who	  sought	  asylum	  in	  France	  in	  
2000	  after	  being	  gang	  raped	  in	  Haiti	  in	  the	  context	  of	  generalized	  political	  violence.	  
She	  was	  denied	  asylum	  in	  France	  because	  the	  gang	  rape	  was	  not	  thought	  to	  be	  
politically	  motivated	  and	  too	  ordinary	  to	  amount	  to	  persecution	  to	  justify	  asylum	  
(only	  3.3%	  of	  Haitian	  applicants	  received	  asylum	  during	  that	  period	  in	  France)	  
(Fassin	  2012,	  142).	  Like	  the	  80%	  of	  asylum	  seekers	  whose	  applications	  are	  turned	  
down,	  she	  became	  an	  illegal	  immigrant.	  After	  two	  years	  of	  living	  in	  isolation	  and	  
becoming	  increasingly	  sicker,	  malnourished,	  and	  depressed	  she	  finally	  saw	  a	  doctor.	  
They	  learned	  that	  she	  was	  HIV	  positive	  and	  suffering	  from	  advanced	  AIDS,	  the	  result	  
of	  the	  gang	  rape	  experienced	  in	  Haiti.	  She	  sought	  and	  won	  asylum	  on	  medical	  
grounds,	  granted	  under	  the	  so-­‐called	  humanitarian	  rationale.	  “Her	  words	  about	  the	  
violence	  she	  had	  suffered	  were	  doubted,”	  writes	  Fassin,	  “but	  ultimately	  her	  body	  
spoke	  for	  her”	  (Fassin	  2012,	  142).	  I	  use	  this	  example	  to	  show	  that	  for	  Marie,	  her	  
words	  and	  actions	  were	  meaningless	  to	  the	  authorities	  who	  had	  the	  power	  to	  define	  
her	  either	  as	  a	  legitimate	  person	  entitled	  to	  asylum	  and	  citizenship,	  or	  as	  
illegitimate,	  a	  liar,	  and	  illegal.	  It	  was	  only	  when	  her	  body,	  her	  bare	  life,	  made	  her	  
suffering	  and	  trauma	  clear	  that	  she	  could	  be	  believed.	  This,	  I	  think,	  is	  what	  Arendt	  
has	  in	  mind	  when	  she	  argues	  that	  stateless	  brings	  with	  it	  the	  diminishment	  of	  
meaningful	  speech	  and	  action	  –	  there	  was	  simply	  nobody	  who	  found	  her	  words	  
meaningful.	  	  
In	  sum,	  though	  stateless	  people	  retain	  the	  capacity	  for	  action	  because	  it	  is	  rooted	  
in	  natality,	  statelessness	  deprives	  them	  of	  other	  fundamental	  requirements	  of	  action	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–	  a	  community	  to	  judge	  their	  action	  and	  speech	  as	  meaningful	  and	  the	  possibility	  for	  
a	  reliable	  public	  space	  in	  which	  to	  act.	  The	  problem	  with	  refugee	  camps	  is	  that	  they	  
systematically	  deny	  refugees	  these	  latter	  two	  conditions	  and	  thus	  make	  agency	  as	  
difficult	  as	  possible.	  Life	  in	  refugee	  camps	  and	  other	  spaces	  of	  containment	  amount	  
to	  systematic	  obstacles	  to	  agency	  that	  systemically	  undermine	  the	  political	  life	  of	  
stateless	  people.	  Again,	  its	  not	  to	  say	  that	  its	  impossible	  to	  act	  –	  something	  Arendt	  
explicitly	  denied	  –	  but	  it	  creates	  the	  conditions	  where	  such	  action	  is	  unlikely	  and	  
difficult,	  and	  without	  a	  reliable	  political	  space	  where	  you	  are	  judged	  according	  to	  
your	  words	  and	  deeds,	  even	  our	  ontologically	  rooted	  capacity	  is	  not	  sufficient.17	  
	  
Conclusion	  
	   To	  summarize,	  I	  have	  argued	  above	  that	  philosophers	  ought	  to	  take	  more	  
seriously	  the	  ontological	  deprivation	  of	  statelessness	  described	  by	  Arendt	  in	  
considering	  our	  moral	  obligations	  to	  refugees	  and	  stateless	  people.	  The	  ontological	  
deprivation	  contained	  three	  separated	  but	  interdependent	  elements	  that	  together	  
showed	  that	  statelessness	  deprives	  people	  of	  certain	  essential	  features	  of	  their	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17	  How	  to	  understand	  the	  place	  of	  action	  in	  the	  lives	  of	  rightless	  people	  is	  a	  current	  
debate	  among	  Arendt	  scholars.	  Schaap	  (2011)	  and	  Rancière	  (2004)	  stress	  that	  for	  
Arendt	  rightless	  people	  are	  unable	  to	  act	  and	  claim	  their	  right	  to	  have	  rights	  because	  
they	  are	  politically	  impotent	  for	  her	  without	  a	  political	  community.	  By	  contrast,	  
Barbour	  argues	  that	  for	  Arendt,	  rightless	  people	  retain	  the	  capacity	  to	  act	  since	  
nothing	  more	  is	  required	  for	  action	  than	  a	  space	  of	  appearance	  and	  this	  space	  takes	  
shape	  “anywhere	  humans	  come	  together	  in	  word	  and	  deed”	  (Barbour	  2012,	  315).	  I	  
situate	  my	  reading	  of	  Arendt	  between	  the	  two.	  I	  agree	  with	  Barbour	  against	  Schaap	  
and	  Rancière	  that	  because	  action	  is	  rooted	  in	  natality	  it	  remains	  a	  capacity	  for	  even	  
rightless	  people.	  Yet	  against	  Barbour,	  I	  want	  to	  stress	  that	  action	  requires	  more	  than	  
just	  a	  space	  of	  appearance	  –	  it	  requires	  a	  public	  who	  will	  judge	  the	  action	  and	  speech	  
as	  meaningful.	  Intersubjective	  recognition	  as	  well	  as	  a	  durable,	  reliable	  public	  space	  
are	  missing	  for	  stateless	  and	  rightless	  individuals.	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humanity	  in	  a	  fundamental	  though	  never	  absolute	  way.	  So	  understood,	  this	  view	  of	  
statelessness	  gives	  rise,	  I	  will	  argue,	  to	  a	  different	  understanding	  of	  our	  obligations	  
to	  stateless	  people.	  Given	  that	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  stateless	  people	  are	  never	  
resettled	  and	  remain	  displaced	  for	  prolonged	  periods	  of	  time,	  philosophers	  ought	  to	  
be	  concerned	  with	  ethical	  norms	  that	  will	  help	  stateless	  people	  mitigate,	  if	  not	  
entirely	  overcome,	  the	  ontological	  deprivation	  and	  be	  included	  in	  the	  common	  
realm	  of	  humanity.	  I	  conclude	  this	  paper	  by	  discussing	  some	  suggestions	  that	  follow	  
from	  a	  recognition	  of	  the	  reality	  and	  harm	  of	  the	  ontological	  deprivation.	  	  
One	  ethical	  obligation	  that	  follows	  from	  my	  analysis	  is	  to	  rethink	  the	  ethics	  of	  
long-­‐term	  encampment	  and	  reconsider	  it	  as	  a	  morally	  acceptable	  solution	  since	  it	  
effectively	  excludes	  people	  from	  the	  common	  realm	  and	  contributes	  to	  the	  
diminishment	  of	  their	  ability	  to	  speak	  and	  act.	  One	  way	  to	  overcome	  this	  aspect	  of	  
the	  ontological	  deprivation	  then,	  is	  to	  think	  of	  ways	  that	  the	  long-­‐term	  displaced	  can	  
be	  reintegrated	  back	  into	  the	  common	  world,	  even	  though	  they	  may	  remain	  without	  
citizenship.	  For	  example,	  some	  NGOs,	  such	  as	  the	  US	  Committee	  for	  Refugees	  and	  
Immigrants	  (USCRI),	  advocate	  for	  the	  “temporary	  local	  integration”	  of	  refugees	  
while	  a	  permanent	  durable	  solution	  is	  negotiated.	  Here	  the	  UNHCR	  would	  fund	  
programs	  that	  allow	  stateless	  people	  to	  integrate	  locally	  such	  as	  by	  funding	  
educational	  programs,	  primary	  schooling	  for	  children,	  and	  co-­‐op	  and	  other	  work	  
programs.	  Rather	  than	  funding	  camps	  that	  segregate	  people	  from	  the	  common	  
world,	  the	  UNHCR	  would	  fund	  education,	  employment,	  social	  services	  within	  states	  
that	  host	  refugees	  that	  would	  both	  allow	  stateless	  people	  to	  be	  integrated	  into	  a	  
political	  community	  (temporarily,	  until	  a	  more	  permanent	  solution	  is	  found)	  and	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would	  be	  materially	  beneficial	  to	  host	  states	  (Smith	  2004).	  
Second,	  given	  the	  influence	  (financially	  and	  politically)	  that	  Western	  states	  
exercise	  at	  the	  UNHCR,	  members	  of	  these	  states	  ought	  to	  advocate	  for	  a	  more	  ethical	  
aid	  policy	  concerning	  stateless	  people,	  one	  that	  respects	  them	  as	  members	  of	  the	  
common	  realm	  and	  as	  political	  agents.	  This	  may	  entail,	  for	  example,	  insisting	  that	  
when	  refugee	  camps	  are	  necessary	  as	  the	  only	  way	  to	  provide	  aid,	  they	  respect	  
human	  rights.	  Currently,	  though	  the	  Refugee	  Convention	  lists	  rights	  that	  all	  refugees	  
have	  even	  while	  displaced	  –	  including	  the	  right	  to	  earn	  wages,	  the	  right	  to	  education,	  
the	  right	  to	  public	  assistance	  at	  the	  same	  level	  as	  nationals,	  the	  right	  to	  courts	  and	  
travel	  documents,	  and,	  perhaps	  most	  importantly,	  the	  right	  to	  freedom	  of	  movement	  
–	  they	  are	  routinely	  denied	  to	  stateless	  people	  and	  this	  is	  seen	  as	  morally	  
unproblematic.	  An	  ethical	  policy	  ought	  to	  take	  more	  seriously	  the	  ontological	  
deprivation	  of	  statelessness	  and	  include	  ways	  to	  mitigate	  this	  in	  our	  policies	  
concerning	  stateless	  people.	  	  
To	  be	  sure,	  I	  do	  not	  mean	  to	  claim	  that	  the	  above	  suggestions	  would	  provide	  
a	  comprehensive	  solution	  to	  the	  global	  refugee	  crisis.	  Rather,	  they	  are	  meant	  simply	  
to	  point	  in	  the	  direction	  that	  our	  ethical	  thinking	  might	  take.	  I	  began	  this	  paper	  by	  
arguing	  that	  normative	  political	  philosophy	  is	  mistaken	  to	  think	  that	  our	  only	  ethical	  
obligation	  to	  refugees	  consist	  in	  admitting	  them	  to	  our	  country.	  My	  aim	  in	  arguing	  
for	  the	  ontological	  deprivation	  is	  that	  when	  the	  harm	  of	  statelessness	  is	  reframed	  in	  
this	  way,	  we	  see	  that	  many	  other	  obligations	  become	  at	  least	  conceivable.	  If	  the	  
harm	  is	  partly	  that	  stateless	  people	  are	  excluded	  from	  the	  common	  realm	  and	  are	  
not	  consistently	  recognized	  as	  political	  agents,	  then	  philosophers	  ought	  to	  be	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concerned	  with	  thinking	  about	  ways	  that	  this	  harm	  can	  be	  mitigated	  if	  not	  entirely	  
eliminated	  in	  the	  current	  global	  political	  context.	  We	  must	  be	  concerned	  with	  our	  
ethical	  obligations	  to	  the	  millions	  of	  people	  who	  will	  never	  be	  resettled	  and	  will	  
spend	  decades	  living	  in	  refugee	  camps	  that	  are	  supported,	  at	  least	  in	  part,	  by	  the	  
policies	  of	  our	  states.	  Given	  the	  current	  global	  reality,	  overcoming	  the	  ontological	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